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FROM GRACE TO GRIDS: RETHINKING 
DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR PAROLE 
KIMBERLY THOMAS & PAUL REINGOLD* 
 
Current due process law gives little protection to prisoners at the point 
of parole, even though the parole decision, like sentencing, determines 
whether or not a person will serve more time or will go free. The doctrine 
regarding parole, which developed mostly in the late 1970s, was based on a 
judicial understanding of parole as an experimental, subjective, and largely 
standardless art—rooted in assessing the individual “character” of the 
potential parolee. 
In this Article we examine the foundations of the doctrine, and 
conclude that the due process inquiry at the point of parole should take into 
account the stark changes in sentencing and parole practice over the years. 
Since the development of the parole due process doctrine in the 1970s, two 
seismic shifts have occurred. First, the constitutional protections provided 
at the initial sentencing have vastly increased. Second, the parole process 
itself has been transformed by the move to evidence-based parole 
guidelines and the use of actuarial risk-assessment instruments as the norm 
in parole decision-making. 
In this Article we document the changes in this under-scrutinized area 
and assert that the liberty interest in parole should more closely match the 
present-day legal account of the liberty interest that courts afford 
defendants at sentencing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sentencing and parole are two sides of the same coin. Both involve 
figuring how much risk the individual poses to the public, and then deciding 
how much time the person should serve. But when it comes to the due 
process protections afforded to defendants at sentencing and to prisoners at 
parole, defendants at sentencing get modern due process rights, while 
prisoners at parole get barely a horse-and-buggy. The foundational law of 
sentencing and parole, especially the stark differences in the level of due 
process protections afforded at the front end versus at the back end of the 
criminal justice system, is a product of the time when it was developed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. We think that changes in sentencing and parole 
since then have made the asymmetry unwieldy and anachronistic, and that a 
correction is called for. 
To be specific, the Court set the pattern for its parole due process cases 
back when parole was still viewed as something new and experimental. It 
was a time when parole boards engaged, at least according to the lore of 
that era, in a fine-grained assessment of the character of the potential 
parolee. This narrative about the art of granting parole was instrumental in 
the Court’s framing of the extent to which due process protections attached 
to parole decision-making. 
In 1979, in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and 
Correctional Complex,1 the Court first examined the due process 
protections that should be given to the parole decision.2 In denying that 
there was a fundamental liberty interest in parole, the Court described the 
 
1  442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
2  Id. at 3. 
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parole decision as a “synthesis of record facts and personal observation 
filtered through the experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a 
predictive judgment as to what is best”3—what the Court called a 
“discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing 
primarily what a man is and what he may become . . . .”4 
Even at the time of Greenholtz, this system of broad parole discretion 
was coming under criticism.5 To the extent that the Court’s vision of parole 
was true at the time, it is not true now. Today, parole occurs in a different 
landscape, against a backdrop of a shift in sentencing systems, additional 
broad constitutional protections at sentencing itself, and a blurring of the 
line between sentencing and parole. Further, modern parole decisions are 
made with detailed guidelines and based on actuarial tables about the 
statistical likelihood that a person with the inmate’s characteristics will 
reoffend. 
In light of these shifts in sentencing protections and parole practice, 
this Article invites a re-examination of the foundations of the due process 
protections provided to prisoners at the point of parole, and posits an 
approach to the due process interest in parole that reflects these modern 
realities. 
In Part I, we describe aspects of early parole practice and the law of 
due process that developed around parole. We look closely at Greenholtz, 
which specifically examined the due process interest in parole release, but 
we also look at the cases leading up to and following Greenholtz. 
In Part II, we outline shifts in the due process protections provided to 
defendants at sentencing, particularly the increased legal and constitutional 
constraints placed on the sentencing process. 
Taken together, Parts I and II reveal that today there are two disparate 
regimes—a front-end sentencing regime which gets significant 
constitutional scrutiny, and a back-end sentencing regime (parole) which 
gets little. Instead of being viewed as a unitary or overlapping process that 
determines how long people who commit crimes should serve, today, 
sentencing and parole have become disconnected, functionally and 
analytically. 
In Part III, we describe modern parole practices, with a focus on the 
 
3  Id. at 8. 
4  Id. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert—Counsel in the 
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 813 (1961)). 
5  See Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing by Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1976) (noting criticism of parole reformers and that “an influential 
member of Congress” had “call[ed] into serious question the assumptions on which parole 
decisions are based”). 
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decision whether or not to parole. This Part first looks at the prevalence, 
even in the modern sentencing era, of parole. Second, this Part examines 
two interrelated moves in parole practice—the use of parole guidelines and 
the use of risk and needs-assessment instruments. Some important points 
emerge. First, parole still matters. Although indeterminate sentencing may 
have fallen out of favor in recent decades, most prisoners are still subject to 
parole because that is the regime under which they were sentenced. Second, 
the types of parole guidelines, and the types of risk-assessment tools that 
parole boards use today, are quite different from the ones that were in place 
when the U.S. Supreme Court laid down the doctrines that contributed to 
the “deregulation” of parole. Today, most parole boards rely at least in part 
on actuarial-based studies, and not on the more subjective, nuanced 
predictions of human behavior that were the norm when the Supreme Court 
moved to a more hands-off approach to parole. 
In Part IV, we advance the idea that the due process inquiry into the 
parole release decision should take into account the changes in the reality of 
sentencing and parole practice. The liberty interest in the parole release 
decision should more closely reflect the current legal account of the liberty 
interest at sentencing; a fundamental liberty interest in parole should be 
recognized. 
I.  EARLY PAROLE DEVELOPMENT AND DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS 
A. PAROLE PRACTICE 
For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, parole as we know 
it today did not exist.6 Criminal defendants were typically sentenced to 
fixed prison terms, and early release was a matter of executive clemency.7 
In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, penology became more 
scientific, and the insights of psychology began to be applied to it.8 In the 
 
6  See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Parole: Corpse or Phoenix?, 50 Aᴍ. Cʀɪᴍ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 303, 307–08 
(2013) (stating that parole “is a relatively modern invention that came into being in the 
nineteenth century along with use of a discretionary sentencing system to promote the 
rehabilitation of offenders”). Parole was first adopted in 1877 in New York, and fifty years 
later, all but three states had adopted parole.  Id. 
7  See generally Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 Hᴀʀᴠ. J.L. & 
Pᴜʙ. Pᴏʟ’ʏ 833, 851–52 (2016) (Clemency was “recognized in the English common law and 
the early days of our republic. It was used regularly during the nineteenth century and for 
most of the twentieth.”). 
8  See, e.g., STEPHEN E. BROWN ET. AL., CRIMINOLOGY: EXPLAINING CRIME AND ITS 
CONTEXT 193–95 (Janice Eccleston & Michael C. Braswell eds., 7th ed. 2010) (describing 
positivism as dominating American criminology and penology in the earlier portion of the 
twentieth century and tied to the belief that those who engaged in criminal behavior had a 
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twentieth century, to encourage good behavior and to foster rehabilitation, 
corrections professionals requested, and legislatures passed, new laws 
permitting indeterminate sentencing (with minimum and maximum terms, 
for example ten to fifteen years).9 The theory was that inmates should be 
given the chance to earn their way to freedom.10 Indeterminate sentencing 
was coupled with reward structures like good-time or disciplinary credits, 
which could shorten both the minimum and maximum terms of well-
behaved inmates.11 
But by far the most innovative and effective reward was release on 
parole.12 Parole’s main virtue was that it provided a powerful inducement 
 
medical illness that could be cured during an indeterminate amount of prison time and 
released upon successful rehabilitation). 
Parole was an integral component of the rehabilitative model that the American criminal justice 
system endorsed from the end of the nineteenth century until well into the twentieth. The theory 
was that new medical, sociological, and psychological theories and techniques could transform a 
prison from ‘the black flower of civilized society’ into the equivalent of a hospital where 
prisoners would be treated and reformed, rather than punished. 
Larkin, supra note 6, at 309–10. 
9  See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A 
Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1315, 1321–22 (2005) (describing the federal 
system before sentencing guidelines in which “federal sentences were both ‘indeterminate’ 
and heavily dependent on the discretion of district court judges. In an indeterminate 
sentencing system, the judge sentences a defendant either to a specified term or to a range of 
years, but the number of years the defendant actually serves is determined later by an 
administrative body like a parole board.”). 
10  Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 301–02 (1974) (explaining the implications of indeterminate 
sentencing and how it allows the decisionmaker to “consider the defendant’s conduct in 
prison, focusing on such factors as the prisoner’s disciplinary record and his general 
cooperativeness as a prisoner,” which are within the control of the individual prisoner); see 
also Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate 
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1251 (2011) (noting that, under an indeterminate 
sentencing system, the release date is set by factors including the offender’s prison record). 
11  See generally James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 
UCLA L. Rᴇᴠ. 217 (1982) (discussing the role of “good time” credits in indeterminate 
sentencing). 
12  A. Mitchell Polinsky, Deterrence and the Optimality of Rewarding Prisoners for 
Good Behavior, 44 INT’L REV. LAW & ECON, 1, 2 (2015) (unlike other reward systems, “it is 
always desirable to reward prisoners for good behavior through either positive time off or a 
positive period of parole”); W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 395, 395 (2011). 
First, states can use parole as a population safety valve without indiscriminately endangering 
public safety, since parole boards can release only those prisoners least likely to reoffend. 
Second, indeterminate sentencing gives prisoners incentives both to behave and to rehabilitate 
themselves, since misbehavior and untreated risk factors will prolong their stay in prison. Parole 
boards are ideally situated to make prerelease assessments of a prisoner’s risk because they can 
2. THOMAS 4/21/2017  2:28 PM 
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for inmates to conform to social norms in order to win early release.13 An 
additional virtue of parole was that it extended that inducement even 
beyond release, via the threat of re-incarceration for a parole violation.14 By 
the second half of the twentieth century, parole was becoming a ubiquitous 
feature of American penal law, in both the state and federal systems.15 By 
the late 1970s, parole boards exercised authority to release more than 70% 
of all the people leaving prison.16 
For most of the twentieth century, parole boards maintained relatively 
unfettered discretion when paroling prisoners.17 Or, as it was described in 
1976, “The parole decision, as a key element of a system premised on 
 
do so shortly before release. 
Id. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of 
Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 Iᴏᴡᴀ L. Rᴇᴠ. 491, 497–98, 503 (2008). 
The name coined for the conditional release of a prisoner before completing a sentence derives 
from the French phrase parole d’honneur, loosely translated as ‘word of honor.’ From the outset, 
the concept of parole was aimed at the rehabilitated prisoner—the inmate who had exhibited 
model (or “honorable”) behavior while incarcerated, professed to be a reformed person, and 
accordingly proved to be a safe candidate for discharge. 
Id. 
13  Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 452–
53 (2005) (“Yet, some correctional experts argue that improvements in institutional behavior 
and order result if the inmate believes he has something to lose by violating prison rules.”); 
Mary West-Smith et al., Denial of Parole: An Inmate Perspective, 64 FED. PROB. 3, 5 (2000) 
(“Inmates are led to believe that reduction in sentence length is possible through good 
behavior. Adjustment to prison rules and regulations is not sufficient reason for release on 
parole; however, it comprises a minimum requirement for parole and poor adjustment is a 
reason to deny parole.”) (internal citations omitted). 
14  See generally Tonja Jacobi, Song Richardson & Gregory Barr, The Attrition of Rights 
Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 902–03 (2014) (noting that “a major proportion of 
offenders failing upon reentry—and returning to prison—are doing so as a result of parole 
violations and revocations”). 
15  See Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIM. & 
JUST. 479, 489 (1999) (“By 1927, only three states (Florida, Mississippi, and Virginia) were 
without a parole system, and by 1942, all states and the federal government had such 
systems.”) (internal citations omitted). 
16  JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 62 
(2009) (stating that “by the late 1970s, more than 70 percent of all inmates released were 
released as a result of a parole board’s discretionary decision”). Nevertheless, some courts 
still viewed parole as an innovation or experiment. See infra Part III. 
17  See Sarah French Russell, Review for Release: Juvenile Offenders, State Parole 
Practices, and the Eighth Amendment, 89 IND. L.J. 373, 396 (2014) (noting that historically, 
state parole boards were “able to make release decisions with little oversight from the courts 
regarding the criteria and procedures used for these decisions”); Petersilia, supra note 15, at 
491 (“Parole boards, usually political appointees, traditionally were given broad discretion to 
determine when an offender was ready for release—a decision limited only by the 
constraints of the maximum sentence imposed by the judge.”). 
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rehabilitation or ‘correction,’ is seen as a judgment (usually made by 
inadequately informed decisionmakers) of whether an inmate meets some 
subjective, largely unarticulated standard of ‘reformation’ or ‘recovery’ 
from mental or social illness.”18 
B.  REVIEW UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
The due process rights of people convicted of crimes vary with the 
setting and have changed over time. The key case as to parole—both in 
terms of the Court’s examination of the parole release decision under the 
Due Process Clause, and in terms of the Court’s explanation of its 
understanding of parole is Greenholtz.19 But the Court’s parole-related 
decisions before and after Greenholtz give a fuller understanding of how the 
doctrine came to be what it is today. 
Oddly, we start with a case that is not a parole case, but that is 
foundational for modern due process analysis. In Board of Regents of State 
Colleges v. Roth,20 the plaintiff alleged violations of both due process 
property and liberty interests, in a non-criminal context.21  Roth set the 
backdrop for the parole and sentencing cases that followed it. In Roth, the 
Court ruled against the plaintiff, but it plainly acknowledged that a due 
process liberty interest can extend beyond the four corners of criminal trials 
and sentencing.22 In determining whether a constitutionally protected 
interest was at stake, the Roth Court first rejected the outmoded “rights 
versus privileges” distinction.23 In analyzing the scope of the claimed 
liberty interest, the Court said the idea of “liberty” extended “beyond the 
 
18  Heinz et al., supra note 5, at 1 (internal citations omitted). This parole story does not, 
of course, reflect the entire reality of parole practice. Parole practices have varied across 
jurisdictions, and within jurisdictions based on changes in parole boards, legislatures, and 
political and social concerns. 
19  442 U.S. 1, 1 (1979). 
20  408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
21  Id. at 568–69. Roth involved a challenge by a non-tenure-track professor alleging 
denial of his property and liberty interests when a state university did not renew his one-year 
teaching contract. Id. As to the property interest, the Court found none because the university 
never promised more than one year of employment. Id. at 578–79. The Court said that to 
have a property interest an individual must “have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it” 
created by state law, rule, or understanding.  Id. at 577; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (decided the same day as Roth, and finding a protected property 
interest in “continued employment” by a state junior college professor). 
22  Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (“[T]he Court has required due process protection for 
deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal 
process.”). 
23  Id. at 571 n.9; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262, 266 (1970) (rejecting 
distinction and finding protected property interest in receipt of public welfare benefits). 
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sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process” and beyond 
“‘mere freedom from bodily restraint.’”24 The Court stated that a liberty 
interest is implicated when (1) a person’s reputation, honor, integrity or 
good name is at stake,25 or (2) the state has imposed a stigma or barrier to a 
future opportunity.26 
The same year in 1972, in Morrissey v. Brewer,27 the Court found a 
due process liberty interest in avoiding parole revocation.28 Before reaching 
the issue of whether due process protection applied, the Court first 
examined the purpose and function of parole within the criminal justice 
system at the time.29 The Court noted that parole before the end of a 
sentence “has become an integral part of the penological system.”30 The 
Court recognized that “parole is an established variation on 
imprisonment”—a process unlike the “ad hoc exercise of [executive] 
clemency.”31 
As to people facing a possible return to prison from parole, the Court 
noted that a parolee was someone who was living and working in the 
community, despite being subject to conditions of release and other 
behavioral restrictions.32 The Court emphasized that a parolee was at 
liberty; despite the conditional nature of his freedom, he had the ability to 
hold a job and to be with friends and family.33 Given the “implicit” 
understanding that a “parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he 
substantially abides by the conditions of parole,” the Court found a liberty 
interest, and therefore an entitlement to due process protections, in any 
decision to revoke parole.34 The Court focused on whether the “individual 
will be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’”35 and found return to prison 
from parole to be just such a loss. On the heels of Morrissey, the Court used 
the same rationale to extend similar due process protections to people 
 
24  Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 & n.11 (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). 
25  Id. at 573 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)). 
26  Id. at 573–74. Roth lost his liberty-interest-based claim because the state neither made 
charges against him that damaged his reputation nor imposed a stigma that impaired his 
freedom to seek other jobs. Id. 
27  408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
28  Id. at 488–90. 
29  Id. at 477–80. 
30  Id. at 477. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 482. 
33  Id. 
34  Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479, 482–85. 
35  Id. at 481–82 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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facing probation revocation.36 
The Court was next faced with a related aspect of parole that 
challenged whether there was a protected liberty interest for someone who 
was not in the community and facing re-incarceration—as in Morrissey—
but instead, facing a possible increase in the time served in prison. In Wolff 
v. McDonnell,37 the Court addressed whether there was a protected liberty 
interest in prison “good time” credits, which allow a prisoner to earn 
deductions against his minimum (and sometimes his maximum) sentence.38  
Such credits can shorten the sentence or hasten the point at which the 
prisoner becomes eligible for parole; conversely, losing the credits can 
effectively lengthen the sentence or delay the prisoner’s parole eligibility. 
In Wolff, the Court made two analytical moves that are relevant to 
parole.39 First, the Court characterized the “good time” question as one 
about prison discipline, focusing on the need for prison officials to be able 
to make practical day-to-day decisions for the security, good order, and 
functioning of the facility.40 Second, the Court tweaked the nature of the 
due process liberty inquiry; the Court asked whether there was an inherent 
or fundamental liberty interest at stake, and even if there was not, if the 
state had effectively created a liberty interest by statute or practice.41 
On the merits, the Court rejected the argument that prisoners have an 
 
36  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–91 (1973). In Scarpelli, the Court also 
added a presumptive right to counsel in both parole and probation revocation proceedings, at 
least where the respondent contests the facts alleged, or there are substantial reasons which 
justify or mitigate the violation, or make revocation inappropriate. Id. at 790–91. 
37  418 U.S. 539, 542 (1974). 
38  Id. at 556–57. 
39  See generally Donna H. Lee, The Law of Typicality: Examining the Procedural Due 
Process Implications of Sandin v. Conner, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 785, 791–95 (2004) 
(examining “the Supreme Court’s movement from the expansion of due process rights in 
Wolff v. McDonnell, to the contraction of these rights in Sandin”). 
40  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562 (describing prison security background to legal analysis); see 
also id. at 556 (“In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs 
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.”). 
41  See Lee, supra note 39, at 791–93 (stating that “Wolff marks the beginning of the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on a state-created liberty interest as the basis for a federal due 
process violation.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Essay, The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1979 (1996) (in an article critical of the Court’s 1970s 
doctrine, noting the move to state-created liberty interests and asserting that this decision and 
others expanded the scope of due process protections); Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: 
The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 507, 510 (1984) (analyzing Wolff as part of Justice White’s view of due 
process protections in which, after being convicted and given a valid sentence, “the only way 
in which a prisoner might have a liberty interest, and hence a procedural right in connection 
with his custody, is if he is given one by the state”). 
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inherent or fundamental right to good time directly under the Constitution.42 
But the Court still found a liberty interest in good time credits because the 
state statute provided a right to the credits and used deprivation of the 
credits as a disciplinary sanction.43 The Court surmised that the loss of good 
time credits did not (typically) cause an immediate or direct change in the 
prisoner’s liberty or custody status, but only did so later and indirectly, by 
virtue of the delayed parole eligibility.44 Finally, the Court noted that its 
determination about the nature and extent of the procedural protections 
required could change over time with changes in parole policy or in how the 
law was implemented.45 
In Greenholtz, the Court finally answered the question as to whether or 
not there was an inherent or fundamental due process liberty interest in 
parole itself.46 In examining that question, the Court described how it 
understood the practice of parole as it existed at the time (in 1979)—namely 
as a novel aspect of the state’s efforts to achieve its punishment goals, 
grounded in a subjective, “‘equity’ type judgment.”47 The Court stated that 
“the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage. In parole 
releases, . . . few certainties exist.”48 The Greenholtz Court viewed the deci-
 
42  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–57. 
43  Id. at 560–61. 
44  Id. 
Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free or in prison, a 
matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is 
not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of parole is for the parolee. The deprivation, 
very likely, does not then and there work any change in the conditions of his liberty. 
Id. 
45  Id. at 571–72. 
Our conclusion that some, but not all, of the procedures specified in Morrissey and Scarpelli 
must accompany the deprivation of good time by state prison authorities is not graven in stone. 
As the nature of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years, circumstances may then 
exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this Court. 
Id. 
46  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 3 (1979). 
In 1976, the Court in Meachum v. Fano, determined that a prisoner did not have a protected 
liberty interest in a transfer from one prison to another. 427 U.S. 215, 228–29 (1976). The 
Court classified the case as one dealing with “conditions of confinement” in which prison 
administrators needed authority to maintain order, and therefore one that was less likely to 
implicate a liberty interest. Id. at 222. As in Wolff and Greenholtz, the Court looked to 
whether there was a state statute or practice that mandated a certain result (like parole or 
transfer) if specific factors were met. Id. at 226. 
47  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8. 
48  Id. But cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (describing parole as “an 
integral part of the penological system” and an “established variation on imprisonment”). 
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sion to parole as highly subjective—a kind of art of personality assessment 
and gut instinct.49 The Court described the parole decision as a “discre-
tionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily 
what a man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has 
done.”50 It said that the decision to grant or deny parole was a “purely 
subjective” appraisal, in contrast to the “fact-bound” decision involved in 
parole revocation.51 
Importantly, the Court noted that purpose of due process protections is 
to minimize “erroneous decisions.”52 This matters because under the system 
that the Court describes—where there is a “purely subjective” decision-
making process—it is unsurprising that the Due Process Clause would not 
have much work to do to protect against “erroneous decisions.” There can 
be no error to guard against in a process that is based on “discretionary 
assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables” about “what a man is.”53 
The Court made an additional distinction, contrasting people facing 
parole with those already on parole, both as to their custody status and their 
perceived entitlement to freedom.54 Based on its understanding of how 
parole decisions were made, and on the custody status of those who were 
subject to parole, the Court held that prisoners do not have an inherent or 
fundamental liberty interest in parole based on the Constitution that would 
give rise to due process protections.55 
But, as in Wolff, based on the specific language of the state statute, the 
Court reached the opposite conclusion on the question of whether or not 
 
49  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8. 
In each case, the decision differs from the traditional mold of judicial decisionmaking in that the 
choice involves a synthesis of record facts and personal observation filtered through the 
experience of the decisionmaker and leading to a predictive judgment as to what is best both for 
the individual inmate and for the community. This latter conclusion requires the Board to assess 
whether, in light of the nature of the crime, the inmate’s release will minimize the gravity of the 
offense, weaken the deterrent impact on others, and undermine respect for the administration of 
justice. The entire inquiry is, in a sense, an “equity” type judgment that cannot always be 
articulated in traditional findings. 
Id. 
50  Id. at 10 (quoting Kadish, supra note 4, at 813). 
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 13 (“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the 
Constitution, and in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous 
decisions.”). 
53  Id. at 10 (quoting Kadish, supra note 4, at 813). 
54  Id. at 9 (noting a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one already 
has, as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires). 
55  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. 
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Nebraska had created a due process right.56  The Court found that due to the 
“unique structure and language” of the provision, Nebraska gave prisoners a 
liberty interest in parole release protected by the Due Process Clause.57 
After Greenholtz, the Court’s examination of whether the state created 
constitutional interests became the norm. A few years after Greenholtz, the 
Court was presented with nearly the same issue in Board of Pardons v. 
Allen,58 where the state appellate court held that the parole board’s broad 
discretion under the Montana statute at issue in Allen required the opposite 
result.59 The Supreme Court disagreed.60 While it acknowledged that 
“parole is a privilege, not a right,”61 it easily found that the mandatory 
language of the statute created a liberty interest in parole if the statutory 
conditions were met.62 As in Greenholtz, the law conferred a protectable 
due process right, even though the board’s decision was “subjective and 
predictive” and required the exercise of “broad discretion.”63 In a case 
addressing administrative segregation, Hewitt v. Helms,64 again the Court 
said that a legitimate entitlement to a liberty or property interest can arise 
 
56  Id. at 11–12. 
57  Id. at 12. The Nebraska statute said that the “Board of Parole . . . shall order [the 
prisoner’s] release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred . . .” for one 
of three specific reasons. Id. at 11 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114(1) (1976)) (emphasis 
added). The Court relied on the mandatory language of the statute to confer a liberty interest 
that triggers due process protection. 
58  482 U.S. 369 (1987). 
59  Id. at 371. 
60  Id. at 381. 
61  Id. at 377. The Court focused on language, especially the word “shall” which seemed 
to create a presumption that parole release will occur. Id. at 374–78. 
62  Id. at 376. The Montana statute said that “the board shall release on parole . . . any 
person confined in the . . . state prison when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that 
the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community.” Id. 
(citing Mont. Code Ann. § 46–23–201 (1985) (emphasis in the Court’s opinion)). 
63  Id. at 375–81. 
64  459 U.S. 460, 462 (1983). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708 (1976), the Court, 
drawing on the analysis in Roth, emphasized the limited nature of due process protections 
and sought to ground these protections—in the context of property interests—in state laws, 
rules, and understandings, and focusing on the change or “alteration” of legal status that 
occurs at the time of the relevant decision. The Court suggested two categories of liberty 
interests: those “fundamental liberties” which originate in the Bill of Rights, and other 
liberty interests that are the creation of state law. Id. at 710–13. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 
480, 495–96 (1980), the Court found that involuntary transfer from a prison to a mental 
health facility was a decision in which the inmate had a protected liberty interest. In 
Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466–67 (1981), the Court found 
no inherent constitutional right and no statutorily-created right to a protected liberty interest 
in the decision to grant or deny a commutation. There is no actual expectation that a 
commutation will be granted, but only a “unilateral hope.” Id. at 465. 
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from the Due Process Clause itself, or from state law or practice (as it did in 
Wolff and Greenholtz).65 In Hewitt, the Court found that there was no 
constitutional right to remain in general population, but that mandatory state 
law and practice nevertheless conferred a liberty interest that required at 
least minimal due process protections for a prisoner’s removal to 
segregation.66 
In 1995, in Sandin v. Conner,67 the Court took a big step back from the 
line of cases we have just described.68 The Court self-consciously changed 
the inquiry for determining whether a due process liberty interest exists, 
stating that  
these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not 
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by 
the Due Process Clause of its own force, . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and 
significant hardship69 on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison 
life.70  
As a result, liberty interests arising directly under the Constitution will get 
the same protection as before (as will substantive due process rights), but 
liberty interests that stem from state-created law or practice will not, other 
than in exceptional circumstances. The Court’s new test was a reaction to 
(1) the overemphasis on statutory and administrative evidence of a state 
“right” that could make almost anything a liberty interest subject to due 
 
65  Hewitt, 450 U.S. at 466. The Court distinguished its due process cases based on the 
severity of the deprivation, the significance of the decision being made (that is, did it affect 
important rights or involve merely the “daily operations” of the prison or similar routine 
conditions of confinement), and the status of the plaintiff, namely whether he had already 
been convicted or was only a pretrial detainee. Id. at 474–76. 
66  Id. at 476. Given the wide-ranging deference accorded to prison authorities in 
disciplinary matters, and the modest interest of a prisoner in staying out of segregation, the 
Court held that the minimal non-adversarial procedural protections provided by the state 
were sufficient. Id. at 476–78. 
67  515 U.S. 472, 472 (1995). 
68  See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1668 (2003) 
(stating that Sandin was “a dramatic confirmation” of the Court’s shift in due process and 
discussing the implications for “large-scale” inmate litigation, for example, in litigation 
regarding classification and conditions in supermax facilities); Pierce, Jr., supra note 41, at 
1988–89 (stating that the “Court narrowed dramatically the scope of prisoners’ ‘liberty’ 
interests protected by due process” in Sandin). 
69  See generally Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress 
and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1259–61 (1998) (noting that the 
“lower courts that have considered procedural due process cases since Conner have indeed 
had considerable difficulty deciding who has suffered an atypical and significant 
deprivation,” that the Court seemed to indicate fewer due process rights for prisoners, that 
the scope of prisoner’s due process rights was not obvious from this language). 
70  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 
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process protections,71 and (2) the worry that this emphasis would actually 
discourage states from creating sensible prison and parole administrative 
regimes, in order to avoid having to provide burdensome or expensive 
procedural protections.72 
In Sandin, the prisoner had challenged his misconduct sanction 
(disciplinary segregation) for lack of due process protections.73 The Court 
found the modest sanction to be a “typical” hardship of prison life: its 
purpose was the “punishment of incarcerated prisoners” under a 
disciplinary regime imposed by prison officials.74 The Court contrasted the 
case with one in which “the State’s action will inevitably affect the duration 
of his sentence,”75 suggesting that more protection might be required in that 
event. 
In Young v. Harper,76 the Court determined that a “pre-parole” 
program, where the prisoner was released into the community, but 
technically still under department control, was sufficiently like parole (as 
addressed in Morrissey77) to merit due process protections.78 To the extent 
that the Morrissey Court tried to draw a clear line between people who were 
in custody and people who were in the community, subject to department of 
corrections supervision, Young slightly blurred this line and made relevant 
other factors.79 At the same time, Young reiterated the importance of the 
released/non-released distinction in the Court’s calculation.80 
Most recently, in Swarthout v. Cooke,81 the Court upheld the finding of 
 
71  Id. at 481–82. 
72  Id. at 483 (“We believe that the search for a negative implication from mandatory 
language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the real concerns undergirding the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
73  Id. at 475–77. 
74  Id. at 484–85 (protecting only against “atypical” hardships and declining to protect in 
this case). 
75  Id. at 487. 
76  520 U.S. 143, 143 (1997). 
77  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (“The essence of parole is release 
from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by 
certain rules during the balance of the sentence.”). 
78  Young, 520 U.S. at 144–45. 
79  Id. at 143–44. 
80  Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871, 887 
(2000) (noting that the Court seems to have an in-prison versus out-of-prison distinction, 
under which “[i]f it is about what the prison does with a prisoner in custody, then the court is 
very much likely to find that Sandin applies, and there is no deprivation of liberty. However, 
if it involves the release from custody, then the court is much more likely to find that Sandin 
is distinguishable.”). 
81  562 U.S. 216, 217 (2011) (per curiam). 
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a liberty interest in parole, but relied, as before, on whether the state had 
created a liberty interest in parole.82  In Cooke, two first-degree murderers 
challenged their denial of parole under a California law, which only 
required “some evidence” to support the conclusion that inmates were 
“unsuitable for parole” if the board found that they were “currently 
dangerous.”83 Although finding a liberty interest, the Court held that the 
state’s “some evidence” rule was not a part of the federal due process 
requirement, and that the minimal protections provided to the prisoners 
were sufficient to satisfy due process.84 
The last case that bears mention is Kerry v. Din,85 not because it deals 
with parole, but because it exposes the continuing debate within the Court 
about how to frame the liberty interest for procedural due process 
purposes.86 Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, found that there was no 
Fifth Amendment interest at stake.87 He said that “no process is due if one 
is not deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property.’”88 Justice Scalia accused the 
dissent of articulating a “novel theory of implied nonfundamental rights.”89 
Justice Breyer, for the four dissenters, did not see the theory as novel at 
 
82  Id. at 220. 
83  Id. at 217 (citing In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (2008)). 
84  Id. at 220–22. 
85  135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015). 
86  Id. at 2131. In Din, the Court examined a due process claim raised by the wife of a 
non-citizen living abroad. Id. She argued that she had a constitutional right to live in the 
United States with her spouse, and that she was denied procedural due process by the 
government’s denial of her husband’s visa application based on a statutory exemption for 
“terrorism.”  Id. at 2131–32. The husband had served the Taliban in an administrative 
capacity; the visa denial cited the “terrorism” provision but gave no further reasons. Id. 
at 2131. 
87  Id. at 2133. Justices Kennedy and Alito, concurring only in the judgment, said it was 
unnecessary to decide the liberty interest issue, because regardless of whether or not such an 
interest existed, the statement provided by the Government satisfied the Due Process Clause. 
Id. at 2139–40 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 754 (1972)). The Court declined 
to decide professors’ alleged First Amendment right to hear the views of a non-citizen 
Marxist whose visa was denied; the Government had provided a “facially legitimate and 
bona fide” reason for the visa denial, which was all that was required in the context of 
immigration, and therefore the existence of the underlying right did not need to be addressed. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. 
88  Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011)) (per 
curiam). Citing the Magna Carta, Coke, and Blackstone, Justice Scalia said that the wife 
“could not conceivably claim that the denial of [her husband’s] visa application deprived her 
[or her husband] of life or property; and . . . a claim that it deprived her of liberty is equally 
absurd.” Id. at 2132–33. 
89  Id. at 2137. 
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all.90 He distinguished liberty interests arising under the Constitution which 
trigger procedural due process protections from fundamental rights 
requiring substantive due process protection.91 
C.  DUE PROCESS AT SENTENCING 
Parallel to the Court’s cases examining the procedural due process 
protections that apply within state departments of corrections, the Court has 
established a very different line of cases that creates an almost unquestioned 
right to due process at sentencing. The most significant of these is Gardner 
v. Florida,92 a death penalty case. In Gardner, a plurality of the Court found 
that the defendant was denied due process where his sentence was imposed, 
at least in part, based on confidential information that was not disclosed to 
the defendant and that he did not have the opportunity to refute or explain.93 
The Court said that “the sentencing process,” in addition to the trial, “must 
satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.”94 While Gardner could 
 
90  See id. at 2142. 
91  Id. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220–22 (2005) (stating that the Due 
Process Clause requires compliance with fair procedures when the government deprives an 
individual of certain “liberty” or “property” interests), with Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 
301–02 (1993) (stating that the Due Process Clause limits the extent to which government 
can substantively regulate certain “fundamental” rights, “no matter what process is 
provided”). Cf. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 
n.48 (1977) (stating that liberty interests arising under the Constitution for procedural due 
process purposes are not the same as fundamental rights requiring substantive due process 
protection). 
92  430 U.S. 349, 349 (1977). Another relevant earlier case, though not cited by the 
Gardner Court, is Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948) (finding that an inmate 
was denied due process of the law, where, without counsel, he was sentenced on the basis of 
assumptions concerning his criminal record that were materially false). See also William A. 
McDaniel, Jr., Gardner v. Florida: The Application of Due Process to Sentencing 
Procedures, 63 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1288–90 (1977) (noting that the cases cited by Gardner 
were generously interpreted to find a due process protection at sentencing and noting the 
Court’s break from relying on the Eighth Amendment, despite Gardner’s capital sentence). 
See generally Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
821 (1968). 
93  Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362. 
94  Id. at 358. The Gardner Court cites Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 131, 137 (1967) 
(finding that the criminally accused 17-year-old petitioner was deprived of due process 
where he was not afforded the assistance of counsel at a combined probation revocation and 
sentencing hearing); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610–11 (reversing the convictions of 
the petitioner because the Sex Offenders Act, under which he was sentenced, failed to 
provide procedural safeguards, such as the presence of counsel and opportunity to be heard 
at sentencing); and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521–23 (holding that a defendant 
cannot constitutionally be put to death by a jury selected by purposely excluding all potential 
jurors opposed to the death penalty during jury selection). 
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have been limited to death penalty cases, it has not been.95 To the contrary, 
Gardner is widely cited for the proposition that criminal defendants have a 
robust right to procedural due process protections in all aspects of 
sentencing.96 
Most recently, in Johnson v. United States,97 the Court examined 
whether a sentencing enhancement provision of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause.98 
The Court took it as an uncontroversial point of law that constitutional 
prohibitions on vague statutes “apply not only to statutes defining elements 
of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”99 The Court held that 
increasing the defendant’s sentence under the challenged provision denied 
due process of law.100 
These judge-sentencing cases exist with little reference to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s other due process cases, including other cases addressing 
liberty interests after conviction. Scholars, likewise, have not largely given 
sustained attention to this connection.101 
II.  CHANGES IN CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AT SENTENCING 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, as more “get-tough-on-
crime” policies took hold, the length of prison sentences sharply 
 
95  See, e.g., Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An 
Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1638 (1980) (noting that the defendant’s sentencing interest in 
Gardner was a “life and death situation”). 
96  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Gardner v. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); see also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 128 (1967); 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)). 
97  135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
98  Id. at 2555–57. 
99  Id. at 2557 (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)). There was 
no additional discussion about whether due process protections applied at the sentencing 
phase or what “right” gives rise to due process requirements at sentencing. 
100  Id. (“We are convinced that the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required 
by the residual clause both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement 
by judges. Increasing a defendant’s sentence under the clause denies due process of law.”). 
101  As a rare example, see Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and 
Release Decisions by Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 585–86 (1994) (discussing a 
“nexus between sentencing and parole” in due process); see also McDaniel, Jr., supra note 
92, at 1289–90 (drawing comparisons to Morrissey v. Brewer and stating that a defendant at 
sentencing has a “stronger position because no authority yet has found it necessary to 
incarcerate him”); Fennell and Hall, supra note 95, at 1638–39 (using Morrissey v. Brewer 
and Wolff v. McDonnell to advocate for additional due process protections at sentencing). 
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increased.102 Many factors contributed to the longer sentences: prosecutors’ 
charging practices, mandatory minimums, habitual offender provisions, and 
“truth in sentencing” laws.103 While policy and statutory changes resulted in 
the imposition of longer sentences at the front end, the use of parole and 
how it is implemented contributed to longer prison terms at the back end.104 
A.  SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FACTS THAT INCREASE A 
DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE 
One sentencing trend that took hold was a move away from 
indeterminate sentencing, like ten to fifteen years, toward determinate 
sentencing—like a flat twelve-year sentence.105 Further, to calculate the 
determinate sentence, jurisdictions passed sentencing guidelines, which 
gave judges “ranges” for appropriate sentencing.106 These guidelines 
 
102  The PEW Center on the States, Time Served: The High Cost, Low Return of Longer 
Prison Terms (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2012/06/6/time_served_
report.pdf (reviewing state trends in time served data from 1990–2009). This data showed 
that inmates in 2009 served an average of 2.9 years in custody, an increase of nine months 
(or 36%) over inmates in 1990. Id. at 2–3. The average length of stay varied state to state, 
with Michigan having the longest average time served. Id. at 13. 
103  Id. at 23–24 (noting the variety of policies influencing length of stay, and differing 
importance from state to state); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of 
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1280–83 (2005) (noting the general public’s 
willingness to elect politicians who proposed longer prison sentences in an effort to appear 
“tough on crime”, the imbalance in the media’s portrayal of typical prison lengths skewing 
the public’s perception, interest group peer pressures from groups such as the National Rifle 
Association supporting tougher sentences rather than tougher gun ownership restrictions, and 
prosecutors’ desires to have “longer sentences on the book” as contributing factors). 
104  The PEW Center on the States, supra note 102, at 23, 25. 
105  See WHY PUNISH?  HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 5–6 (Michael Tonry eds., 
2011) (explaining that from 1870–1950, though the prevailing punishment theories had 
utilitarian roots supporting indeterminate sentencing, by 1980 the utilitarian ideals had 
“imploded” and the “virtue and value of retributive ideas seemed self-evident” from the 
writings of many penal theorists, such retributivist ideas favoring determinate sentencing); 
Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of 
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 63–64 (1993) (describing moves by 
state legislatures, following California’s lead in 1976, to structured sentencing and to 
guidelines created by sentencing commissions, and stating that “[d]eterminate sentencing’s 
principal goal has been the elimination of unwarranted disparity, with legislatures seeking 
proportional punishment for different offenses and consistent punishment for similar 
crimes”); see also Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and 
Policy, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1235–36 (2005) (noting concerns about arbitrariness in 
criminal justice decision-making, unwarranted sentencing disparities attributed to racial 
discrimination, the ripening of the due process revolution beginning with Goldberg v. Kelly, 
and the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence as factors contributing to a shift 
away from indeterminate sentencing). 
106  See Chanenson, supra note 13, at 395–96 (describing the move to sentencing 
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systems were developed for several reasons, including concerns about 
disparity within jurisdictions, across different jurisdictions, and in sentences 
correlated with race and gender for otherwise similarly-situated cases.107 
While the federal sentencing guidelines were prominently litigated and 
discussed, many states also developed sentencing guidelines that either 
bound judge’s discretion within the guidelines ranges or were strongly 
suggestive of the appropriate sentence for a given set of offense variables 
and offender characteristics.108 Concurrent with the shift to sentencing 
guidelines was a move to decrease or eliminate the power of parole 
boards.109 These shifts have had important implications for sentencing and 
 
guidelines and the “enduring challenge” of developing guidelines “with an acceptable 
amount of judicial discretion”). 
107  See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“The goal of the Sentencing 
Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the 
evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of 
justice. In this respect, the Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a degree of 
detachment lacking in our earlier system.”); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics 
of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 250 (1993) (discussing the use of “personal characteristics” to 
determine sentencing and noting the requirement that “the commission’s ‘guidelines and 
policy statements [be] entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and 
socioeconomic status of offenders’”); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant 
Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 495, 495–
96 (1990) (stating that a “major goal” of the Sentencing Reform Act was “to reduce disparity 
in sentencing through a new system in which defendants with similar characteristics who 
committed similar crimes received similar sentences” in addition to eliminating parole).  But 
see Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 916–17 (1991) (noting that researchers “who have 
proclaimed sentencing guidelines successful in reducing disparity have missed this point” 
and that the guidelines have not necessarily reduced disparity; they have merely been shown 
to have accomplished giving similar sentences to those that are defined to have committed 
similar offenses). 
108  Cf. Tonry, supra note 105, at 1245 (describing state efforts in the early 1980s to 
eliminate parole release, set specified lengths of sentences, and implement sentencing 
guidelines). See also Rachel Konforty, Efforts to Control Judicial Discretion: The Problem 
of AIDS and Sentencing, 1998 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 49, 59–61 (1998) for a discussion of 
the distinctions between state and federal sentencing guidelines systems; and Neal B. Kauder 
& Brian J. Ostrom, State Sentencing Guidelines Profile and Continuum, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSI/State_Sentencing_
Guidelines.ashx (2008) for statistics on states with sentencing guidelines. See also Mistretta 
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384 (1981) (upholding the federal guidelines against 
separation of powers challenge). 
109  Lowenthal, supra note 105, at 61 (“Two developments in the last twenty years have 
transformed felony sentencing in the United States. First, most jurisdictions have adopted 
determinate sentencing schemes that narrow the range of sanctions available to trial courts 
and reduce or eliminate the broad discretion previously exercised by corrections 
administrators and parole boards.”). 
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parole.110 
A common procedure in these sentencing hearings was for the judge to 
engage in fact-finding about the offense and the offender, and then use 
those facts (usually found by a preponderance of the evidence) to help 
calculate the sentence to be imposed, whether under formal or informal 
sentencing guidelines.111 A significant question that arose in guidelines-
based determinate sentencing systems was whether such judicial fact-
finding violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.112 
Over the past fifteen years, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Sixth Amendment to cover nearly all facts that increase the actual punish-
ment that a defendant is subjected to at sentencing.113 This line of cases is 
based on the underlying Constitutional protections “against conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged,”114 and that a 
criminal defendant has “the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all 
the elements of the crime with which he is charged.”115 
The watershed case was Apprendi v. New Jersey,116 where the Court 
reviewed a statute that permitted an increase in the maximum punishment if 
the crime was shown to be a “hate crime.”117 The enhancement provision 
increased the defendant’s sentence on the charge from a possible five to ten 
years to a twelve-year term without any jury determination of the 
 
110  See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 37, 48–49 (2005) (arguing that the transition away from parole board toward 
determinate sentencing based on the federal guidelines created problems, including judges’ 
perception that sentences were too harsh and based on “mechanical” and “rigid” calculations 
that left little room for consideration of factors that most practitioners considered relevant). 
111  See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 228 (1999) (expressing doubts, in the 
year before Apprendi, about the constitutionality of judge findings by a preponderance that 
enhance the penalty, but not ruling on the issue). 
112  See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
113  But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226–27 (1998) (finding 
that fact of a prior conviction is not a separate crime that must be charged or determined by a 
jury). 
114  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
115  United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995); see also United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005). 
116  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
117  Id. at 495–97. The year before, the Court read a federal carjacking statute provision 
that gave harsher penalties if the defendant caused more harm as defining elements of the 
offense rather than as a sentencing provision, in part to avoid relegating the jury’s role to 
“the relative importance of low-level gatekeeping” and to avoid the constitutional question 
of whether a judge could engage in this fact-finding. Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 243–34 (1999). 
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question.118 The Court found the enhancement to be a violation of the right 
to jury trial and due process, and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”119 
In Blakely v. Washington,120 the Court applied Apprendi to state 
sentencing guidelines.121 In Blakely, the judge-found facts were used to 
depart upward from the guidelines range, and increased the sentence the 
defendant actually received.122 The Court determined that “the ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may 
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.”123  A year later, in United States v. Booker,124 
the Court applied Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines125 and made 
the guidelines advisory to remedy the constitutional violation.126 The 
Booker Court read Blakely broadly, holding that the Sixth Amendment 
requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact that the law 
makes “essential to the [defendant’s] punishment.”127 
 
118  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470–72. 
119  Id. at 490. 
120  542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
121  Id. at 301. 
122  Id. at 299–301. 
123  Id. at 303 (emphasis in original). The Court said that the ability of the judge to depart 
from the guidelines range for “substantial and compelling reasons” did not change the Sixth 
Amendment analysis.  Id. at 299. 
124  543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
125  Id. at 243–44. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, prior to Booker, required judges to 
determine the guideline range and (largely) to impose a sentence within the range prescribed 
by the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & Supp. IV) (“[T]he court shall impose 
a sentence of the kind, and within the [Guidelines] range.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000 & 
Supp. IV) (permitting departures from the prescribed range when the judge “finds that there 
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that 
should result in a sentence different from that described”). The Court rejected the argument 
that the fact that the guidelines were promulgated by the Sentencing Commission instead of 
a legislature changed the constitutional analysis. Booker, 543 U.S. at 237–38. 
126  Id. at 245. 
127  Id. at 232 (describing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004)). Post-
Booker the Court decided a series of cases that clarify how much deference can be given to 
the federal sentencing guidelines. For example, the Court said that although a sentencing 
judge must “give respectful consideration to the Guidelines, Booker ‘permits the court to 
tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.’” Kimbrough v. United States, 
552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (quoting Booker, 542 U.S. at 245–46); see also, e.g., Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007) (The Guidelines serve as “the starting point and the initial 
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In subsequent decisions, the Court applied this line of cases to factual 
findings that exposed defendants to a potential death sentence,128 as well as 
extending the Sixth Amendment protection to mandatory minimum 
sentences.129 
The Court has somewhat limited the proceedings in which these Sixth 
Amendment rights apply. The protections apply at sentencing and at 
resentencing if the sentence has been vacated on appeal. But they do not 
apply at “sentence-modification proceedings” (under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2)), because modification proceedings “do not implicate the 
[jury-based factfinding] interests identified in Booker.”130 
At least one scholar, however, has noted that the import of Apprendi 
fits within our practice of parole. Professor W. David Ball advocates for a 
functional reading of Apprendi and argues that this body of law “should 
apply any time the jury power is infringed, including during the substantial 
percentage of American sentences that terminate in a parole board’s discre-
tionary release decision.”131 
 
benchmark,” but judges may impose sentences anywhere within the statutory range.); Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007) (On appeal, the federal sentencing guidelines are 
subject to review for “reasonableness,” and a sentence within the guidelines range is subject 
to a non-binding presumption of reasonableness.). 
128  Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619, 622 (2016) (finding a Sixth Amendment 
violation in the ability of a jury to issue an “advisory” opinion to judge, but where the judge 
was the ultimate finder of fact in death penalty cases); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 
(2002) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation where trial judge sentenced the defendant to 
death without jurors, determining aggravating circumstances that qualified the defendant for 
the death penalty). 
129  Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2163–64 (2013) (finding that “[a]ny 
fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to 
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
130  Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010); see also Pepper v. United States, 
562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011) (holding that the defendant’s post-incarceration conduct could be 
taken into account on re-sentencing and could support a downward departure from the 
advisory guidelines). 
131  W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, 
and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 896 (2009) (viewing Apprendi as 
rooted in controlling punishment, as defined by the deprivation of liberty, and applying to 
parole); see also id. at 952–56 (analyzing in the context of the California parole statute); cf. 
Nancy J. King & Brynne E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits 
Eligibility for Probation or Parole Release, 26(5) FED. SENT’G. REP. 287 (2014) (noting the 
likely application of Alleyne to state sentencing provisions that extend the sentence that must 
be served prior to eligibility for parole or probation); see also id. at 289 (stating that Alleyne 
only applies to sentencing and that “delays in release eligibility that result from the decisions 
of corrections officials made after initial sentencing, even when such decisions depend upon 
findings of fact, are not affected by Alleyne”). 
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B.  EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
In addition to shifts in Sixth Amendment doctrine, another sentencing 
trend worth mentioning is the application of greater Eighth Amendment 
scrutiny to sentences given to juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons,132 Graham v. 
Florida,133 and Miller v. Alabama,134 the Court set limits on the severity of 
sentences that can be handed down to juveniles. While these cases affect a 
narrow set of defendants, they are significant for our purposes because, 
first, they illustrate the Court’s interest in front-end sentencing beyond the 
narrow area of the death penalty, and, more importantly, they show how the 
Court has, in one context, incorporated considerations of parole release into 
constitutional sentencing doctrine and imposed requirements for meaningful 
back-end sentencing review as well, as part of the parole regime. 
In Roper, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred the 
imposition of the death penalty on youthful offenders (those under eighteen 
at the time of the offense).135 In reversing the Court’s earlier contrary 
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky,136 the Court determined that persons under 
eighteen are categorically less deserving of the most severe sanction due to 
their impetuosity, lack of maturity, susceptibility to peer influences, and 
underdeveloped character.137 
In Graham, the Court was faced with an Eighth Amendment challenge 
to a life without parole sentence for a juvenile who “[did] not kill, intend to 
kill, or foresee that life [would] be taken.”138 The Court found that such 
persons—who had “twice diminished moral culpability” by virtue of their 
youth and their lack of heightened mens rea—could not be sentenced to life 
without parole.139 Instead, they were entitled to a “meaningful opportunity 
to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”140 
In Miller, the Court went a step further, and held that the Eighth 
Amendment barred the mandatory imposition of a sentence of life without 
parole on persons under age eighteen at the time of their offense.141 If a life 
without parole sentence is possible, then the sentencing court must hold an 
individualized hearing, at which the judge considers age and the “hallmark 
 
132  543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
133  560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
134  132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). 
135  Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. 
136  492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
137  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70, 574. 
138  Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 69. 
139  Id. at 69. 
140  Id. at 75. 
141  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012). 
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features” of youth, the impetuousness associated with youth, the failure to 
appreciate risks and consequences, the family environment from which the 
youth cannot extract himself, the circumstances of the offense, including the 
influence of family and peer pressure, and the youth’s limitations in 
navigating the court system and fully assisting his counsel.142 The Court 
allowed that a sentence of life without parole could still be given, but only 
in “rare” and “uncommon” situations.143  Subsequently, in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana,144 the Court found that Miller was a substantive change in the 
law that must be applied retroactively.145 
The most relevant case for our purposes is Graham. The Graham 
Court said that the state is “not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a 
juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide offense” but it must give 
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”146 The Graham Court did not mandate how or 
when such offenders must be given a “second look” at parole, leaving the 
mechanism for that review up to the states.147 But the Court surely seemed 
to contemplate review at a point or points in time long after the sentencing 
hearing. While the Court conceded that some youthful offenders may in fact 
spend their entire lives in prison, such a sentence will occur only if the state 
later determines them to be unfit for release.148 
The Montgomery Court further encouraged the perception that the 
Court views parole, at least in this context, as similar to front-end 
sentencing.149 The Court explicitly permitted that a state may choose to 
remedy an unconstitutional mandatory life without parole sentence through 
giving the juvenile access to parole review instead of resentencing.150  The 
availability of parole, “ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only 
transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to 
serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”151 
 
142  Id. at 2468. 
143  Id. at 2469. 
144  136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
145  Id. at 735–37. 
146  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. (“The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons 
convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will remain behind bars for 
life. It does prohibit States from making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never 
will be fit to reenter society.”). 
149  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
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Commentators, scholars, and legislatures have also seized upon the 
Court’s language in Graham, Miller, and Montgomery as a signal of the 
Court’s possible interest in parole review for youthful offenders.152 
Some states responded to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amend-
ment sentencing law by making changes to their parole review for people 
who committed their crimes as juveniles. For example, Connecticut 
amended its parole provisions for individuals sentenced to more than ten 
years for an offense committed while a juvenile so that the parole board 
takes into account a variety of youth-related criteria and whether the person 
has demonstrated “substantial rehabilitation.”153 In a similar vein, California 
also passed youth-specific parole legislation154 in light of Miller that, among 
other things, requires the parole board to “give great weight to the 
diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark 
features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the 
prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.”155 
Other states have not taken the invitation to adjust parole based on the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrine and are facing litigation. For example, 
in Michigan, after Miller, juveniles serving mandatory life without parole 
sued under Section 1983 to strike down the state’s parole statute, which 
 
152  Laura Cohen, Freedom’s Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama 
and Graham v. Florida, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1048–69 (2014). Cohen notes that 
the Supreme Court’s insistence on release mechanisms for youth facing life terms should lead to 
further increases in the parole-eligible population. Current parole policy and practice, however, 
have received remarkably scant attention in legal scholarship, and virtually no consideration in 
the Graham/Miller literature. Without such systemic examination and, ultimately, reform, parole 
may well prove to be the Potemkin village of Miller and Graham—a mere façade of relief. 
Id. at 1069; Nick Straley, Miller’s Promise: Re-Evaluating Extreme Criminal Sentences for 
Children, 89 WASH. L. REV. 963, 993–1006 (2014) (analyzing the state of Washington’s 
legislative response to Miller and Graham, specifically, a bill that sought to provide youth 
offenders with individualized sentencing hearings and in some cases automatic parole 
eligibility). 
153  See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-125a(f)(2–4) (2015).  The criteria include 
correctional record, the age and circumstances of such person as of the date of the commission of 
the crime or crimes, whether such person has demonstrated remorse and increased maturity since 
the date of the commission of the crime or crimes, such person’s contributions to the welfare of 
other persons through service, such person’s efforts to overcome substance abuse, addiction, 
trauma, lack of education or obstacles that such person may have faced as a child or youth in the 
adult correctional system, the opportunities for rehabilitation in the adult correctional system and 
the overall degree of such person’s rehabilitation considering the nature and circumstances of the 
crime or crimes. 
Id. at § 54-125a(f)(4). 
154  S.B. 260 (Cal. 2013) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041, 3046, 4801 and enacting 
§ 3051 (2016)). 
155  CAL. PENAL CODE § 4801(c) (2016). 
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foreclosed parole in all first-degree murder cases, as applied to juvenile 
offenders.156 The plaintiffs sought a remedy requiring not just routine parole 
board review, but a more robust review that would satisfy the specific 
requirements of Graham and Miller.157 Initially, the federal district court 
granted in part, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, finding that 
the parole statute was unconstitutional as applied to juveniles.158 In a 
remedial order, the court required the parole board to decide the plaintiffs’ 
parole eligibility in a “fair, meaningful, and realistic” way, including—
contrary to its regular practice—that the board give reasons for its deci-
sions.159 The court also prohibited any veto of parole by the sentencing 
court (which was otherwise permitted by statute in cases involving life sen-
tences).160 The district court’s decision was later reversed in light of 
intervening changes in U.S. Supreme Court and state law.161 Similar 
litigation has been pursued in other states.162 
III.  PAROLE AS WE NOW KNOW IT 
A.  SENTENCE LENGTH IS STILL COMMONLY DETERMINED BY A 
PAROLE BOARD 
In any given year, approximately half a million people are paroled.163 
 
156  Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. 
Jan. 30, 2013) (Opinion and Order), rev’d and remanded by 821 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2016), in 
light of intervening changes in the law. 
157  Hill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12160, at *7–9. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. at *8. 
161  Hill v. Snyder, 821 F.3d 763, 771–72 (6th Cir. 2016). 
162  For example, an Iowa prisoner who was resentenced to life with parole under 
Graham, but who was later denied parole, sued the parole board and the state department of 
corrections in federal court, alleging that the “board’s current policies . . . fail to take into 
account [the prisoner’s] youth at the time of his offense and his demonstrated maturity and 
development.” Grant Rodgers, Iowa Officials Wonder What’s Fair for Juveniles Felons, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/25/
iowa-juvenile-felons-fair-sentence/6870007/ (reporting on lawsuit); see also, e.g., Hayden v. 
Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1009 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 25, 2015) (stating that in a challenge to 
the parole review of juvenile offenders, the North Carolina parole board does not give a 
“meaningful opportunity” for release). 
163  Laura M. Maruschak & Thomas P. Bonczar, Probation and Parole in the United 
States, 2012, at 8 (revised Jan. 21, 2015) (“During 2012, nearly 1 million persons moved 
onto and off parole. About 496,100 adults entered parole, while the same estimated number 
exited parole.”). The authors distinguish between conditional and unconditional release. Id. 
Conditional release includes traditional parole: it is a discretionary decision of the board and 
the individual can be returned to prison for a violation. Id. Unconditional release occurs 
2. THOMAS 4/21/2017  2:28 PM 
2017] FROM GRACE TO GRIDS 239 
Modern parole boards often have many functions, including reviewing 
commutation petitions, processing automatic release decisions, setting 
terms of release, and deciding who returns to prison on parole violations.164 
But the prototypical decision about whether and when to parole an inmate is 
still the most frequent one taken up by parole authorities.165 Imposition of 
an indeterminate sentence, followed by a parole board166 release decision is, 
into the twenty-first century, “the most common approach to sentencing in 
the United States.”167 
Discretionary release by parole boards still accounts for at least one-
third and possibly close to half of all prison releases.168 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics data show that of the half million people paroled in 2012, 41% 
were released through discretionary parole board decision-making.169 
 
when the board is mandated to release at a certain point. Id; see also E. Ann Carson & 
Daniela Golinelli, Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions and Releases, 1991–2012, at 4 
(tbl. 2) (2013) (showing historical data for number of conditional and unconditional 
releases). 
164  See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-1-15 (2016). 
(A) All applications for pardon, reprieve or commutation of sentence shall be made in writing to 
the parole board. (B) When an application for a pardon, reprieve or commutation of sentence is 
filed with the parole board, the parole board shall conduct such investigation as is necessary and 
make a recommendation to the governor. 
Id. 
165  See generally Stefan J. Bing, Reconsidering State Parole Board Membership 
Requirements in Light of Model Penal Code Sentencing Revisions, 100 KY. L.J. 871, 872 
(2012) (“Parole boards in many states function as the final step in the sentencing phase; they 
have the final word on the length of the prison sentence. . . . Currently, all fifty states have 
parole boards in some fashion. However, sixteen states have cancelled the release authority 
of their boards.”). 
166  As an example of parole board volume, in 2006, based on survey data from 42 
jurisdictions, an average 8,355 offenders per jurisdiction were considered for parole release 
in that year.  See Center for Research on Youth and Social Policy, Findings from the APAI 
International Survey of Releasing Authorities 9 (tbl. 5) (2008) (hereinafter “CRYSP”). 
167  Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175, 187 
(2005) (citing MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 212 (2004)). 
168  Gail Hughes, Parole Boards Are Worth Saving, CORRECTIONS TODAY, August 2007, 
at 86 (citing APAI 2005 survey results from twenty-one states). But see 2005 Paroling 
Authorities Survey, ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, (2005), http://apaintl.org/resources/
documents/surveys/2005.pdf (stating, without citation, that “33% is usually quoted as the 
rate of discretionary parole in the US” but providing tabular data on which Hughes relied).  
As a historical comparison, the 2005 APAI report cites to survey data from 1997 showing 
that about 44% of inmates were released by discretionary parole.  The number of individuals 
released on parole in that year was 385,835. Id. 
169  Maruschak & Bonczar, supra note 163, at 8; see also Carson & Golinelli, supra note 
163, at 4 (tbl. 2) (showing that in 2012 there were c. 400,000 conditional releases from state 
prisons out of some 580,000 total releases). 
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Interestingly, 2012 was the first year in recent history where discretionary 
board release decisions (typically in indeterminate sentencing regimes) 
comprised a greater percentage of releases than mandatory release decisions 
(typically under determinate sentencing regimes).170 While historically 
discretionary release was the mainstay of parole boards, this study suggests 
that the late-twentieth century trend toward determinate senten-
cing/mandatory release may have slowed and could even reverse (though it 
is probably too soon to know). 
Another useful measure to look at is the number of states that, at least 
in some circumstances, have maintained parole board authority for 
discretionary releases. A significant number of state boards have such 
authority, whether those decisions are made within a system that includes 
indeterminate sentences, or determinate sentences, or both.171 Joan Peter-
silia determined that in 2002 the parole boards in sixteen states had “full” 
release authority, and an additional nineteen states’ boards had “limited” 
release authority, in the sense that the board lacked authority over one or 
more offenses.172 About a dozen states did not allow any parole board input 
into any release decision.173 As noted above, in some states, even where 
current offenders were not subject to the parole board’s jurisdiction, 
prisoners sentenced before the statutory changes took effect were still 
released by the board.174 
 
170  Maruscak & Bonczar, supra note 163, at 8. See generally The PEW Center on the 
States, One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections (2009). 
171  Joel M. Caplan & Susan C. Kinnevy, National Surveys of State Paroling Authorities: 
Models of Service Delivery, 74 FED. PROBATION 34, 35 (2010) (using 2008 APAI data to 
develop information about models of state parole boards). Of course, some states that 
switched from indeterminate sentencing to determinate sentencing may have done so 
prospectively, to avoid ex post facto issues—with the result that the parole board will remain 
active in release decision-making until the indeterminate population is reduced to zero, 
which could take decades. 
172  Petersilia, supra note 16, at 66–67, (tbl. 3.1). A 2005 survey of parole boards 
indicated that thirty states’ boards still had “almost full discretion or operate with some 
limits,” while in sixteen states the boards had been abolished either for all prisoners, or for 
more recently sentenced prisoners. See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, supra note 168 
(providing a summary of responding states and a short description of the extent of the parole 
board’s authority). 
173  See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, supra note 168; Petersilia, supra note 16, at 
66–67, (tbl. 3.1) (stating that fifteen states had eliminated parole); Amy Robinson-Oost, 
Evaluation as the Proper Function of the Parole Board: An Analysis of New York State’s 
Proposed Safe Parole Act, 16 CUNY L. REV. 129, 145 (2012) (citing Minnesota, North 
Carolina, and Oklahoma as jurisdictions that do not allow parole board discretion with 
respect to release timing and citing statutes from those three states). 
174  For example, Arizona’s board has authority over individuals who committed their 
felony offense before January 1, 1994; Arkansas’ board similarly has discretion over pre-
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Some states curtailed their parole boards in the 1980s and 1990s, but 
that trend had slowed by the mid-1990s.175 For example, a 2005 survey of 
parole boards found that “the move to completely abolish the parole boards’ 
authority ended in 1996,” although limits on the board’s authority, due to 
truth-in-sentencing laws, mandatory minimums, and statutory exclusion of 
some offenses, continued.176 
B.  USE OF GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE RELEASE DECISIONS 
For those parole boards that continue to make discretionary decisions 
about release, how they make their decisions has evolved since the 1960s 
and 1970s (back when the U.S. Supreme Court still viewed parole more as a 
new-fangled and instinctual process). Around the same time that the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Greenholtz, the move away from “standardless” 
parole board decision-making had already begun, but not gained full 
steam.177 To be sure, as early as the 1920s, there were some limited 
attempts to use predictive tools to determine whether or not an inmate 
would be likely to commit (or avoid) further crimes.178 Momentum picked 
up in the 1970s to have a more uniform system of parole release 
decisions.179 In 1972, the U.S. Board of Parole developed a pilot program of 
guidelines for parole decision-making.180 This later developed into a 
 
1994 cases.  See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH., INT’L, supra note 168 (providing a list of 
responding states and a short description of the extent of the parole board’s authority). 
175  Hughes, supra note 168, at 86–87 (stating that parole boards were abolished in the 
1980s to mid-1990s but after 1996, while parole board authority was circumscribed in some 
jurisdictions, no other boards were outright abolished). 
176  See ASS’N OF PAROLING AUTH. INT’L, supra note 168, at 12 (describing the types of 
limits placed on responding states’ parole boards). 
177  See Cohen, supra note 152, at 1070; Ariela Gross, History, Race, and Prediction: 
Comments on Harcourt’s Against Prediction, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 235, 236 (2008) 
(“California and the federal government adopted actuarial instruments in the 1970s, and 
twenty-six other states followed by 2004. This trend coincided with the relative demise of 
parole.”); Russell L. Jones, Bernard E. Harcourt’s Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, 
and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2006), 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 219, 222 (2007). 
By 1961, parole boards in only two states were using predictive methods. However, in the 1970s, 
the actuarial approach became more widely accepted. Peter B. Hoffman, director of research, and 
James L. Beck, a research assistant at the United States Board of Parole developed the Salient 
Factor Score as an aid in predicting parole performance. The instrument was developed from the 
Burgess model, but it reduced the number of factors from twenty-one to nine and later to seven, 
and focused heavily on prior criminal history. 
Id. 
178  Heinz et al., supra note 5, at 2 (“The development of prediction tables started in the 
1920’s, and Illinois prison officials adopted them in 1933.”). 
179  See Cohen, supra note 152, at 1070. 
180  James R. Dillon, Doubting Demaree: The Application of Ex Post Facto Principles to 
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guideline table used by the U.S. Parole Board.181 At least some of these 
guidelines were not meant to change paroling behavior or to better predict 
recidivism, but rather were codifications of existing practice so that 
decisions would be more uniform across decision-makers. The first-
generation tools of prediction available at the time were criticized as 
inaccurate, tending to err in favor of keeping people in custody,182 and 
deeply rooted in the “seriousness” of the prisoner’s offense in comparison 
to other salient factors.183 
Under modern practice, parole boards overwhelmingly use decision-
making instruments like parole guidelines to help them to decide whom to 
release. In a 2008 survey of parole authorities, over 80% used written 
guidelines or other decision-making tools, of which 88% included a formal 
scoring process.184 In raw numbers, thirty-six of the forty-four states 
responding to the survey used a decision-making instrument.185 Few parole 
boards need outside authority for the development or use of these 
instruments.186 
Parole guidelines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some 
jurisdictions, the guidelines are largely suggestive or advisory—they list a 
number of factors that the promulgating authority believes to be relevant to 
the release decision. The guidelines are used to funnel the discretion of the 
decision-maker,187 and to attain greater consistency from board member to 
 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines After United States v. Booker, 110 W. Vᴀ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 
1033, 1057–58 (2008). 
181  Heinz et al., supra note 5, at 3 (“In effect, the Federal Parole Board’s goal was to 
institutionalize its own past decision-making behavior by determining by a process of 
induction what its decision rules had been, and then publishing those rules as ‘guidelines’ for 
future decisions.”). 
182  Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with 
Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1409–11 (1979) 
(discussing the two fundamental questions regarding the use of predictions in law—whether 
they are accurate and if accurate, whether they are legitimate to use). 
183  See Petersilia, supra note 15, at 491. 
184  CRYSP, supra note 166, at iv, 12 (2008) (summarizing key findings of U.S. 
jurisdictions related to the release decision process and describing this finding). 
185  See id. at 13 (tbl. 10) (“Use of Decision-Making and Risk Assessment Instruments”). 
186  See id. at 12 (stating that only three releasing authorities “need[ed] outside approval 
for these instruments”). 
187  See Petersilia, supra note 15, at 497–98. 
Parole guidelines are usually actuarial devices that predict the risk of recidivism based on crime 
and offender background information. The guidelines produce a “seriousness” score for each 
individual by summing points assigned for various background characteristics (higher scores 
mean greater risk). Inmates with the least serious crime and the lowest statistical probability of 
reoffending would then be the first to be released. The use of such instruments helps to reduce 
disparity in parole release decision making and has been shown to be more accurate than release 
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board member or panel to panel. Other states’ parole guidelines provide 
much more structure. In Georgia, for example, inmates are given a “risk to 
re-offend score” based on a numerical calculation that includes previous 
felony convictions, prior incarcerations, current offense, age at admission, 
history of drug or alcohol abuse, and employment status at the time of 
arrest.188 This “score” is then combined with the “crime severity level” of 
the offense of conviction to generate a parole guideline recommended term 
of incarceration.189 The guidelines recommendation typically takes the form 
of a range of months within the indeterminate sentence.190 
Whether or not parole guidelines are statutorily binding (or boards are 
otherwise required to follow them), they have a significant impact on who 
is granted parole. For example, a change in the parole grant rate in Texas—
from 29% in September 2010 to 42% in February 2012—has been 
attributed to changes in the state’s parole guidelines that redefined risk 
categories.191 
Parole guidelines typically are drafted so as not to establish a 
presumption of parole. This parallels most underlying statutory and 
regulatory parole schemes, which also tend not to create a right to parole.192 
(There is, however, an incipient movement towards presumptive parole, as 
states struggle to reduce their outsized prison populations in order to cut 
corrections costs.)193 But states are cognizant of existing U.S. Supreme 
 
decisions based on the case study or individualized method. 
Id.; Victoria L. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole 
Boards, 45 S.C. L. Rᴇᴠ. 567, 613 (1994) (“Guidelines inform the inmates of what 
information would be relevant to present at the hearing. With sufficient opportunity for 
departure, the guideline’s criteria provide a means of accomplishing uniformity, 
proportionality, and predictability without unduly fettering appropriate exercise of a parole 
board’s discretion.”). 
188  GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(8) (2012); see Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. 
Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson: Obtaining Relief in Court and Before 
the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 407–08 (2013) (analyzing the provisions of the 
Georgia Parole Board Guidelines in the context of youthful offenders). 
189  See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 475-3-.05(9)–(17) (detailing “Crime Severity Level” 
offenses and recommended sentences based on combined severity level and “risk to re-
offend score”). 
190  Id. 
191  The PEW Center on the States, supra note 102, at 25. 
192  See, e.g., GA. COMP. R & REGS. 475-3-.05(5) (stating that the state regime “does not 
create a liberty interest”); Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Policy Directive 06.05.100 at 1 
(11/01/08) (stating that “a parole guideline score in the high probability range does not create 
a right for the prisoner to be paroled”); see also Robinson-Oost, supra note 173, at 133. 
193  See, e.g., H.B. 4138, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2015 (Mich. 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
47-7-18 (2011) (creating presumptive parole if prisoner meets certain conditions). 
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Court precedent194 and are careful to state that their guidelines do not create 
a right to parole that might be interpreted as a liberty interest enforceable 
under the Due Process Clause.195 
C.  USE OF RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENTS FOR RELEASE 
DECISIONS196 
States have also adopted risk and needs assessment instruments in 
response to pressure to develop “evidence-based” parole systems and to 
improve their decision-making.197 “Since the 1970s, parole authorities have 
moved away from traditional ‘pen and paper’ clinical evaluations conducted 
by correctional or parole personnel toward automated, actuarial-based risk 
and needs assessments, which are believed to more accurately predict 
recidivism.”198 These instruments rely on aggregate statistics and develop 
actuarial tools that examine the statistical relationship between variables 
about individuals and likelihood of risk outcomes.199 But there are still 
value judgments at play–—such as how much risk is tolerable. Further, in 
these judgments, some suggest that parole boards still “err on the side of 
severity.”200 
 
194  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (1995). 
195  See GA. COMP. R & REGS. 475-3-.05(5); Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Policy 
Directive 06.05.100 at 1 (11/01/08). 
196  Edward J. Latessa & Brian Lovins, The Role of Offender Risk Assessment: A Policy 
Maker Guide, 5 VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 203, 212 (2010); Memorandum from the Vera 
Institute of Justice’s Center of Sentencing and Corrections to the Delaware Justice 
Reinvestment Task Force, 9–12 (October 12, 2011). https://ltgov.delaware.gov/taskforces/
djrtf/DJRTF_Risk_Assessment_Memo.pdf. 
197  See generally Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual 
Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1, 9 (2015) (describing the creation and use 
of actuarial risk tools); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk 
Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1443, 1444 (2003) (defining actuarial risk assessment as a method “which employs 
empirically derived ‘mechanical’ rules for combining information to produce a quantitative 
estimate of risk”). 
198  Cohen, supra note 152, at 1070. See generally Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball 
Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. REV. 671 (2015). 
199  See generally Hamilton, supra note 197, at 9 (describing development of actuarial 
tools). 
200 See, e.g., YVONNE JEWKES & JAMIE BENNETT, DICTIONARY OF PRISONS AND 
PUNISHMENT 56 (2008) (explaining that parole boards “err on the side of caution when 
assessing and predicting dangerousness” because the prediction of human behavior can 
never be “100 percent” and the media encourages public opinions that favor imprisoning 
dangerous offenders for long time periods to “keep them off the streets”); cf. Beth 
Schwartzapfel, Parole Boards: Problems and Promise, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 79, 79 (2015). 
The growing movement for criminal justice reform has had little effect on the politics of the 
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The use of risk and needs assessment tools by parole authorities is 
significant, and increasing.201 In recent years, several state legislatures have 
passed laws requiring the use of risk and needs assessments across a 
number of points in the criminal justice process, including at parole 
release.202 
A number of reports provide distinct lenses on overall trends. A 2008 
report found that thirty-two of thirty-seven responding states were using 
some kind of risk assessment instrument as part of the parole process.203 Of 
those thirty-two states, the majority used their own risk assessment tool, 
developed in house.204 Another study, which examined parole board statutes 
and online information, reported that twenty-four states use a risk-
assessment tool in parole release decisions.205 
There are a number of well-regarded and widely-used risk-assessment 
instruments from which to choose. Based on a survey of parole boards, the 
most commonly used risk-assessment tool for a general population of 
prisoners was the LSI-R, Level of Service-Revised, which was used by 12 
states.206 Another commonly used tool was the Static-99, a sex-offender-
 
country’s parole boards. A months-long Marshall Project investigation revealed that parole 
boards remain so deeply cautious about releasing prisoners that in many states they let go only a 
fraction of those eligible, and almost none who are violent offenders—even those who pose little 
danger and whom a judge clearly intended for eventual release. 
Id.; Michael Meltsner, The Dilemmas of Excessive Sentencing: Death May Be Different But 
How Different?, 7 NE. U. L.J. 5, 16 (2015) (“Parole boards, when they exist, are heavily 
influenced by politics and media. The idea of running prisons with rehabilitation foremost in 
mind has been rejected by the public and many professionals.”). 
201  See also Pari McGarraugh, Up or Out: Why “Sufficiently Reliable” Statistical Risk 
Assessment is Appropriate at Sentencing and Inappropriate at Parole, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
1079, 1081 (2013) (arguing that risk assessments should be used, as suggested by a draft 
Model Penal Code proposal at sentencing, and critiquing the use of risk assessments at 
parole, in part, because of the lack of procedural protections). 
202  See National Conference of State Legislatures, E-Bulletin: Sentencing and 
Corrections Policy Updates, Issue 6, at 2–4 (Jan. 2012) (stating that in 2011, at least six state 
legislatures required use of risk and needs assessments; describing New Hampshire, South 
Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio as states where the instrument is used across stages of the 
criminal system, including at the parole board; and stating that Louisiana and New York 
require the assessments for parole); see also Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: 
Are We Up to the Task?, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 153, 157 (2010) (reporting that in at least ten 
states, sentencing judges use risk assessment instruments). 
203  CRYSP, supra note 166, at 12–13 (tbl. 10). 
204  Id. at 13 (tbl. 10) (indicating that eighteen release authorities use in-house risk 
assessment tools). 
205  Robinson-Oost, supra note 173, at 144. This study notes the difficulties of using only 
publicly available information and suggests that the higher numbers found in the direct 
survey of parole boards comes closer to the actual figure. Id. at 143. 
206  CRYSP, supra note 166, at 12 (tbl. 10). 
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specific tool, which was used by seventeen of the thirty-two states.207 
The extent to which risk-assessment tools inform, or even direct, the 
parole board’s decision varies. For example, in Nevada, the assessment tool 
generates a simple risk score as to the likelihood that the prisoner will 
commit a felony on parole: low, moderate, or high.208 This risk score, 
together with a score for the severity of the underlying offense, provides 
“an initial assessment regarding whether to grant parole.”209 Then the parole 
board can look at an additional list of aggravating and mitigating factors 
before making a release decision.210 
What sets such modern parole decision-making apart from the more 
subjective decision-making that dominated parole in the second half of the 
twentieth century is that the risk-assessment instruments themselves are not 
attempting to predict the individual prisoner’s risk of re-offending,211 a fact 
that is sometimes obscured or misunderstood.212 Rather these are actuarial-
based instruments that look at recidivism rates for people who share the 
same characteristics as the potential parolee.213 The instruments are based 
 
207  Id. 
208  Robinson-Oost, supra note 173, at 146. (citing Nevada example, but incorrectly 
stating—at least under present law—that the state relies exclusively on a risk assessment 
tool, while in fact the tool simply generates an initial assessment). See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 
214.514 (2014). 
209  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 214.516 (2014). 
210  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 213.518 (2014). Nevada does not make its risk assessment tool 
information public, but a look at the list of aggravating factors in  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 
213.518 (2014) suggests that some aspects of an inmate’s history, such as prior convictions 
could be “double counted” both in the assessment tool and in the additional aggravating 
factors.  Id. 
211  See John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary 
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–06 (2000) (“In the past several years, the 
field of “violence risk assessment” has seen a dramatic shift away from studies attempting to 
validate the accuracy of clinical predictions, and toward studies attempting to isolate specific 
risk factors that are actuarially (meaning statistically) associated with violence.”). See 
generally John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among 
Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 Vᴀ. L. REV. 391 (2006) (comparing and contrasting 
clinical (i.e., subjective) risk assessment with actuarial-based risk assessment tools. These 
tools have been criticized for a number of reasons, including that some decision makers 
incorrectly perceive that the tools are making individualized predictions.). 
212  E.g., Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: 
Future Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 Tᴇᴍᴘ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 697, 749 
(2011) (“[I]t is clear that many experts and courts have erroneously interpreted the actuarial 
tools and their purposes. . . . The first, which is quite common among the cases, is the 
improper interpretation that group-based scores provide risk-assessment estimates that are 
individualized to specific defendants.”). 
213  See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (2014). Starr notes that: 
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on numerous static factors that have been studied and refined across large 
populations over time.214 For example, the STATIC-99 (used to score male 
sex offenders) looks at ten factors, including categories such as age, prior 
sex offenses, prior non-sex offenses, long-term relationships, and victims 
who are strangers.215 The researchers who design these instruments have 
collected data over time on thousands of sex offenders for whom these 
categories have been charted.216 The researchers can then analyze the data 
to see which factors correlate to recidivism over time, and which factors 
deserve more or less weight.217 The best instruments are regularly being 
refined and recalibrated (and the factors changed or re-weighted), as each 
passing year for each sample population produces more and better data.218 
To be sure, these types of instruments have been subject to criticism, not 
just for the use of imperfect data, but also for concern that the factors used 
will have disparate results based on race and socioeconomic status, 
unrelated to the actual risk of future criminality posed by the individual.219 
 
[T]he instruments provide nothing close to precise predictions of individual recidivism risk. The 
underlying regression models may provide reasonably precise estimates of the average 
recidivism rates for the group of offenders sharing the defendant’s characteristics, but the 
uncertainty about what an individual offender will do is much greater, and when it comes to 
predicting individual behavior, the models offer fairly modest improvements over chance. While 
[evidence-based sentencing] literature sometimes acknowledges this limitation, most advocates 
have downplayed its seriousness, and existing scholarship has not recognized its legal import. 
Id. 
214  Hamilton, supra note 212, at 720. 
The general idea for actuarial ratings for any risk at issue is to identify those factors that are 
correlative to the potential occurrence of the future event at issue, and to effectively assign 
appropriate weights to each factor based on the observation that some factors have greater 
correlative abilities than others relating to the particular result. The theory is that a better model 
of prediction should be based not on any single risk factor, but an accumulation of relevant risk 
factors. 
Id. 
215  See generally, R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Static 99: Improving Actuarial 
Risk Assessments for Sex Offenders 1999–2002, Sol. General Canada (1999). 
216  In re Commitment of Simons, 821 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ill. 2004) (“The Static–99 is 
based upon a study of thousands of sex offenders from England, Canada, and the United 
States.”). 
217  See generally Amy Phenix, et al., Static–99 & Static–2002R Evaluators’ Workbook 
(Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.static99.org/pdfdocs/. 
218  See e.g., Gregory DeClue & Denis L. Zavodny, Forensic Use of the Static-99R: Part 
4. Risk Communication, 1 J. THREAT ASSESSMENT MGMT. 145, 146 (2014) (describing 
evolution of Static-99). 
219  See, e.g., Starr, supra note 213, at 836–41 (arguing that the disparate impact of 
evidence-based sentencing on racial minorities and offenders of lower socioeconomic status 
may be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Janus & Prentky, supra note 
197, at 1487. 
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What such instruments bring to parole boards is not predictive 
certainty about what any individual prisoner will do in the future, but rather 
scientific evidence about how prisoners with the same or similar risk-factor 
profiles have fared in the past, and therefore how statistically the prisoner 
under review is likely to fair in the future. The subjective “art” of parole 
decision-making has been criticized as being little better than flipping a 
coin.220 Risk-based decision-making acknowledges that individual predic-
tive judgments are unreliable, and relies on large-scale statistical sampling 
instead. Even if parole decision-making remains partially an “art” under 
modern practice, the science of statistics provides parole decision-makers 
with far more, and far better information than they had in the past.221 
 
There are three potential sources of prejudice from [actuarial risk assessment] testimony. First, 
there is concern that the scientific and statistical nature of actuarial assessments will unduly 
influence the fact-finder into giving it more weight and credibility than it deserves, and that the 
principle of “actuarial superiority” will exacerbate this tendency. The corollary is that the 
weaknesses of some ARA instruments are too complex for lay fact-finders to apprehend. Second, 
some worry that juries will ignore the lack of “fit” between the actuarially derived risk and the 
legally relevant risk, thus giving ARA too much weight. Third, in the words of Professor Tribe, 
the “incriminating significance” of statistical probabilities is obscure. 
Id. 
220  See Seena Fazel, Coin-flip Judgment of Psychopathic Prisoners’ Risk, Nᴇᴡ 
Sᴄɪᴇɴᴛɪsᴛ, (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22029464-800-coin-flip-
judgement-of-psychopathic-prisoners-risk (highlighting the over-reliance on inherently 
fallible and flawed assessment tools used by officials in the U.S. and Canada to predict 
prisoner failure (i.e., risk of reoffending)  upon parole or release, especially so for prisoners 
with psychopathy); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of 
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 693, 695–97 (1974) (arguing 
against allowing expert testimony in commitment proceedings, challenging the presumption 
of the reliability and validity of psychiatric judgments, and characterizing such judgments 
and diagnoses as inherently unreliable, particularly predictions of a person’s propensity for 
future violence or dangerousness). 
221  Most parole board members believe that they make better decisions as they gain 
experience, and that getting to know individual prisoners is important to good decision-
making. Of course, investment fund managers have similar ingrained beliefs, despite studies 
showing that over time market-indexed funds beat nearly all stock pickers—regardless of 
their experience or the information they possess. See BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK 
DOWN WALL STREET 178–86 (Norton & Company 1999 (1973)). Having the ability to 
exercise discretion in parole makes intuitive sense, at least at the margins. There will always 
be a few prisoners who score very low on recidivism metrics, but whose turnaround in prison 
is so apparent that the risk of release is worth taking; the reverse is also true, a few prisoners 
with superb guideline scores will have persistent character or behavioral deficits that make 
the risk of release not worth taking. 
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IV.  HOW MODERN PAROLE AND SENTENCING PRACTICE INFORMS THE 
LEGAL PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE UNDER MODERN PAROLE. 
We think that due process doctrine regarding parole was developed in 
a different era, and that today the doctrine fails to account for the sea 
change in both sentencing practice and parole practice over the years. We 
fail to see why the due process protections provided at the point of parole 
should not closely parallel the due process protections provided at senten-
cing, given that the practical liberty interests are identical and the decisional 
processes are similar in both situations. In both settings, the decision-maker 
must decide exactly the same questions, namely how much risk does the 
defendant/prisoner pose, and how long should the defendant/prisoner serve? 
We take as a given—and take seriously–—that the procedural 
protections afforded to criminal defendants at sentencing, and prisoners at 
parole, regarding how long they will serve should derive organically from 
the realities of sentencing and parole. But where, as here, both sentencing 
and parole have shifted seismically since the development of the respective 
due process doctrines, those shifts should call into question the soundness 
of the doctrinal structure that was formed and erected on what today are 
outdated understandings of sentencing and parole practice. As noted earlier, 
the Greenholtz Court characterized the nature of the parole decision as 
“subjective,” and described the purpose of due process as to minimize 
“erroneous decisions.”222 When the parole decision hinges on subjective 
insight into the character of the individual, it stands to reason that the Court 
would not see a fundamental liberty interest, and would only find one if the 
state had explicitly created one. But the near universal reliance on parole 
guidelines and risk assessment instruments (even if some attendant discre-
tion remains to depart from these norms), demand, at a minimum, that the 
state be seen as creating a system which provides an entitlement to the fair 
and consistent application of this structured process, and to outcomes con-
sistent with the outputs of the chosen metrics. 
The changes in sentencing law, and the thin distinctions between the 
total amount of punishment, the amount of punishment imposed at 
sentencing by the judge, and the amount of punishment imposed by the 
parole board, make anachronistic the siloing of parole into a separate 
category that is unworthy of due process protections. The due process 
protections extended (or not extended) at parole should reference, if not 
parallel, the protections extended (or not) at sentencing. Courts assume that 
 
222  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 
(1979) (“The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and 
in the realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”). 
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there is a constitutionally-protected liberty interest at the imposition of a 
sentence because the defendant will be deprived of liberty for X time, but 
exactly the same decision is being made by the board at the point of parole. 
We think the two liberty interests are functionally indistinguishable and that 
a liberty interest should be recognized at the parole release decision. 
We note that recognizing a liberty interest in parole is, of course, not 
the end of the analysis when examining whether a failure to give certain 
procedural protections violates due process. Once a court determines that a 
liberty interest is present, the question is then “What process is due?”223 
Shifting this inquiry puts the focus on the harder, but more relevant, 
question.224 
We also note that such a shift would not undermine the analysis for the 
due process protections afforded for conditions of confinement. Rather we 
suggest that there should be a more unitary due process standard for 
decisions that determine the length of confinement. 
We are not the first scholars to note the inconsistency of applying due 
process at sentencing, but not applying it at the point of the parole release 
decision. Professor Ball notes: 
[I]t seems absurd to hold that due process obtains during the sentencing process, 
which governs the prospective duration of restrained liberty, but that [at parole] it is 
no restraint on the actual length of time those in prison will spend there. Nor does it 
make sense to hold that a parolee enjoys due process protections once she has been 
conditionally released, but that she has no protections during the hearing that 
determines whether or when she will be granted that conditional release. An offender 
cannot have inherent due process interests in both of these stages but not in parole 
suitability itself.225 
Nor is our view of linking the punishment imposed at sentencing with 
the punishment later imposed at parole without precedent. The draft of the 
Model Penal Code, currently under consideration, moves in its own way to 
erase the line between initial sentencing and parole release.226 One of the 
proposed Model Penal Code sections on sentencing provides principles for 
a new regime of “second look” sentencing, which would be conducted by 
 
223  See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571–72 (1974). 
224  Instead of, for example, encouraging gamesmanship about statutory wording, see, 
e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) (“[W]e believe that the search for a 
negative implication from mandatory language in prisoner regulations has strayed from the 
real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
225  Ball, supra note 131, at 957. 
226  Kevin R. Reitz, Modification of Long-Term Prison Sentences; Principles for 
Legislation, MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.6, sentencing (Tentative Draft No. 2 2011) at 75–77 
(providing principals for “second look” sentencing); cf. id. at § 6.06(4) and (5) (determinate 
sentencing). 
2. THOMAS 4/21/2017  2:28 PM 
2017] FROM GRACE TO GRIDS 251 
judges after the defendant has served fifteen or more years in prison.227 The 
proposals, in tandem, recommend the prospective elimination of parole 
board release.228 
CONCLUSION 
Context matters. The U.S. Supreme Court’s choice to provide little to 
no independent due process protections for parole release decisions was 
based, in part, on a view of parole as an art of standard-less discretion, and 
at a time when the criminal justice system provided very little constitutional 
protection or structure even for front-end sentencing decisions.  This world 
no longer exists. Now, constitutional sentencing doctrine is a robust area of 
law that, in some instances, acknowledges the relationship between sen-
tencing after conviction and parole release decisions. Those parole release 
decisions, once based on gut intuition about “what a man is,” are now based 
on parole guidelines and actuarial risk and needs assessments. If the 
purpose of due process protection is, as Greenholtz asserted, to minimize 
“erroneous decisions,”229 these shifts in context call for a change in our 
understanding of the extent of due process protection for the parole release 
decision. 
  
 
227  See id. § 305.6, at 75–77; Margaret Colgate Love & Cecilia Klingele, First Thoughts 
About “Second Look” and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 859, 873 (2011). 
As the commentary to proposed Section 305.6 explains, the purpose of this “second look” 
provision is twofold. First, it recognizes that the United States makes “heavy use of lengthy 
prison terms—dramatically more so than other Western democracies.” Although the provision 
has sparked some difference of opinion among Institute members, in terms of both sentencing 
theory and institutional competence, there now appears to be consensus that courts must have 
some power to reexamine a lengthy sentence after a period of years, particularly if the public 
mood that produced a particularly harsh sentence has mellowed or the overall legal environment 
has changed. The second motivation is normative, and focuses more on the circumstances of the 
particular prisoner than on the external environment. 
Id. 
228  See Reitz, supra note 226, at Appendix B, Reporter’s Study: The Question of Parole-
Release Authority (eliminating parole board release authority). We applaud the creativity of 
the Model Penal Code proposals, but we also strike a note of caution. Although eliminating 
parole board authority could support a “second-look” sentencing system, based on our own 
experience in Michigan, when (elected) judges are empowered years after the initial 
sentencing to revisit, modify, or resentence long-term prisoners, we have not seen the kind of 
fair, uniform, transparent, and consistent results that professional parole boards can strive to 
produce. 
229  Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 
(1979). 
